In the exploratory study reported here, we tested the efficacy of an intervention designed to train teenagers with Möbius syndrome (MS) to increase the use of alternative communication strategies (e.g., gestures) to compensate for their lack of facial expressivity. Specifically, we expected the intervention to increase the level of rapport experienced in social interactions by our participants. In addition, we aimed to identify the mechanisms responsible for any such increase in rapport. In the study, five teenagers with MS interacted with (...) three naïve participants without MS before the intervention, and with three different naïve participants without MS after the intervention. Rapport was assessed by self-report and by behavioral coders who rated videos of the interactions. Individual non-verbal behavior was assessed via behavioral coders, whereas verbal behavior was automatically extracted from the sound files. Alignment was assessed using cross recurrence quantification analysis and mixed-effects models. The results showed that observer-coded rapport was greater after the intervention, whereas self-reported rapport did not change significantly. Observer-coded gesture and expressivity increased in participants with and without MS, whereas overall linguistic alignment decreased. Fidgeting and repetitiveness of verbal behavior also decreased in both groups. In sum, the intervention may impact non-verbal and verbal behavior in participants with and without MS, increasing rapport as well as overall gesturing, while decreasing alignment. (shrink)

Die „seelische Krankheit Friedlosigkeit“ ist der Ausgangspunkt für die psychologische Begründung einer Streitkultur, die auf Dialog und nicht auf Durchsetzung aufbaut. Intimität und intimer Dialog sind Schlüsselbegriffe zur Formulierung eines „Lernmodell Liebe“ , das einerseits die psychische Funktionalität von Streit betont und andererseits die Konfliktlogik paardynamischer Verflechtungen als Anstoß für ein sinnbezogenes dyadisches Lernen voneinander hervorhebt. C. F. v. Weizsäcker’s notion of a „mental illness of peacelessness“ is the starting point for a psychological theory of a „culture of constructive debates“ (...) based on dialogue as well as resonance instead of enforcement. Intimacy and intimate dialogue are keywords for formulating a “paradigm of love” . On the one hand this emphasises the psychological functionality of disagreements and on the other hand it highlights the logic of conflicts in relationships as an impulse for meaningful dyadic learning. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Medical Migration and Moral Responsibility Lending Money to Developing Countries Culture and Religion Health Research and Resources Conclusions References.

The essays in this book engage the original and controversial claims from Michael Boylan's A Just Society. Each essay discusses Boylan's claims from a particular chapter and offers a critical analysis of these claims. Boylan responds to the essays in his lengthy and philosophically rich reply.

In this volume specialists of medieval music and philosophy put the medieval 'musica' into the context of ideas and institutions in which it existed. The significance of 'musica' cannot be understood from a modern point of view since 'music' does not match the medieval 'musica'.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 145-146 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas Jolley. Locke. His Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 233. $55.00, cloth; $19.95, paper. One of the main aims of this lean and clearly set out book is "to argue for the fundamental unity of Locke's thought" in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Thus while it deals with many of the usual 'central (...) themes' (ideas, knowledge, freedom, personal identity, etc.), this Locke is more ambitious than are other general surveys of the Essay. Another, related aim of the book is to defend Locke against charges of inconsistency. Here, it is successful in many instances. But even as sympathetic a reader as Jolley has to admit several times that there are in Locke's text "elements of inconsistency," positions that are "hard to reconcile" with each other, and "tensions" if not contradictions.For the most part Jolley's exposition follows the structure of the Essay, beginning with "the origin and nature of ideas," going through the various topics from Book II, then moving to themes in Book III ("Classification and Language") and ending with an account of Book IV ("Knowledge and Faith"). He proceeds by giving brief expositions of Locke's arguments on the issues at hand, sometimes reflecting on alternative readings, and considering objections to, and defences of Locke. There is some discussion of other major seventeenth-century philosophers, and there are—fairly general—references to the corpuscular philosophy and to Aristotelianism. But on the whole, Jolley does not burden his account with much historical context, focusing instead on individual "issues" and arguments concerning Locke's own text.Yet, sometimes Jolley's discussion of Locke's arguments leaves the reader with statements that require considerable elaboration. For example, in his treatment of Reid's critique of Locke's account of personal identity (according to which Locke's theory is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity), he ends his discussion by simply stating that "it is not obviously foolish to question whether the transitivity relation holds for identity over time" (121). Foolish or not, what is obvious is that more needs to be said to make this suggestion plausible, both in itself and as part of a reading of Locke.At other times Jolley's expositions are not as clear as they might be and remain unconvincing. Thus, in defending Michael Ayers's much debated view that all Lockean ideas are of the nature of mental images, he concedes that it is difficult to accommodate Locke's ideas of reflection (i.e., ideas of mental operations) to this reading. Yet he defends it, saying that Locke interprets the imagist programme "with some latitude." But if ideas of reflection are excluded, it would seem rather difficult to persist with the claim that Locke "is indeed an imagist." This relates to another issue that is much discussed in Locke scholarship: the notion of what Locke calls "substratum" or "pure substance in general." As Jolley reports, Michael Ayers has argued that 'substratum' does not stand for a bare particular but must be understood in the light of Locke's doctrine of real essence: real essence and substance are not to be equated but they pick out the same thing. Thus, according to Ayers, when Locke draws attention to our ignorance of both substance and real essence, he is not preaching agnosticism at two distinct metaphysical levels. Jolley rejects this reading. But while he points out, rightly in my view, that substratum concerns our thinking about objects, in places he appears to accept that the notion is a metaphysical one, for he holds (against Ayers) [End Page 145] that the distinction between substratum and real essence does concern different metaphysical levels (73). Locke himself is clear enough about the status of the "notion of pure substance in general." When he introduces it (II.xxiii.2), he does so as part of his account of how complex ideas of substances are formed: the notion is part of our ideas of particular kinds of substances. Now this notion cannot be derived... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 145-146 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas Jolley. Locke. His Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 233. $55.00, cloth; $19.95, paper. One of the main aims of this lean and clearly set out book is "to argue for the fundamental unity of Locke's thought" in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Thus while it deals with many of the usual 'central (...) themes' (ideas, knowledge, freedom, personal identity, etc.), this Locke is more ambitious than are other general surveys of the Essay. Another, related aim of the book is to defend Locke against charges of inconsistency. Here, it is successful in many instances. But even as sympathetic a reader as Jolley has to admit several times that there are in Locke's text "elements of inconsistency," positions that are "hard to reconcile" with each other, and "tensions" if not contradictions.For the most part Jolley's exposition follows the structure of the Essay, beginning with "the origin and nature of ideas," going through the various topics from Book II, then moving to themes in Book III ("Classification and Language") and ending with an account of Book IV ("Knowledge and Faith"). He proceeds by giving brief expositions of Locke's arguments on the issues at hand, sometimes reflecting on alternative readings, and considering objections to, and defences of Locke. There is some discussion of other major seventeenth-century philosophers, and there are—fairly general—references to the corpuscular philosophy and to Aristotelianism. But on the whole, Jolley does not burden his account with much historical context, focusing instead on individual "issues" and arguments concerning Locke's own text.Yet, sometimes Jolley's discussion of Locke's arguments leaves the reader with statements that require considerable elaboration. For example, in his treatment of Reid's critique of Locke's account of personal identity (according to which Locke's theory is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity), he ends his discussion by simply stating that "it is not obviously foolish to question whether the transitivity relation holds for identity over time" (121). Foolish or not, what is obvious is that more needs to be said to make this suggestion plausible, both in itself and as part of a reading of Locke.At other times Jolley's expositions are not as clear as they might be and remain unconvincing. Thus, in defending Michael Ayers's much debated view that all Lockean ideas are of the nature of mental images, he concedes that it is difficult to accommodate Locke's ideas of reflection (i.e., ideas of mental operations) to this reading. Yet he defends it, saying that Locke interprets the imagist programme "with some latitude." But if ideas of reflection are excluded, it would seem rather difficult to persist with the claim that Locke "is indeed an imagist." This relates to another issue that is much discussed in Locke scholarship: the notion of what Locke calls "substratum" or "pure substance in general." As Jolley reports, Michael Ayers has argued that 'substratum' does not stand for a bare particular but must be understood in the light of Locke's doctrine of real essence: real essence and substance are not to be equated but they pick out the same thing. Thus, according to Ayers, when Locke draws attention to our ignorance of both substance and real essence, he is not preaching agnosticism at two distinct metaphysical levels. Jolley rejects this reading. But while he points out, rightly in my view, that substratum concerns our thinking about objects, in places he appears to accept that the notion is a metaphysical one, for he holds (against Ayers) [End Page 145] that the distinction between substratum and real essence does concern different metaphysical levels (73). Locke himself is clear enough about the status of the "notion of pure substance in general." When he introduces it (II.xxiii.2), he does so as part of his account of how complex ideas of substances are formed: the notion is part of our ideas of particular kinds of substances. Now this notion cannot be derived... (shrink)

The notion of relating to one's own mental states and acts plays a prominent role in present-day philosophy of mind. To a considerable extent, this notion has its roots in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accounts of inner sense. This paper examines German theories of inner sense of the 1770s. It focuses, in particular, on two Göttingen-based thinkers, Christoph Meiners and Michael Hissmann, who provided the first detailed analysis of the "varieties of inner consciousness" (Meiners's phrase). For example, they distinguish between (...) apperception, self-consciousness, and the feeling of personality. The paper analyzes and evaluates Meiners's and Hissmann's account of distinctions such as these. (shrink)

John Lockes Essay uber den menschlichen Verstand (zuerst 1690 erschienen) ist eines der einflussreichsten Bucher der Philosophiegeschichte. Es behandelt vorwiegend erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Themen, nimmt aber auch Stellung zu Fragen aus der Philosophie des Geistes, der Religionsphilosophie und der Ethik. Locke war einer der Initiatoren und fuhrenden Kopfe der europaischen Aufklarung. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Essay wird auch in der Philosophie der Gegenwart vehement fortgesetzt. Die elf Beitrage dieses Bandes, die Bibliographie und ein ausfuhrliches Glossar machen das Buch zu einem (...) wichtigen Begleittext zu Lockes Werk. Mit Beitragen von: Michael Ayers, Reinhard Brandt, John Colman, Bertram Kienzle, Heiner F. Klemme, Lorenz Kruger, Michel Malherbe, Rolf W. Puster, G.A.J. Rogers, Rainer Specht, Jurgen Sprute und Udo Thiel". (shrink)

_50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists presents_ a collection of original essays drawn from an international group of prominent voices in the fields of academia, science, literature, media and politics who offer carefully considered statements of why they are atheists. Features a truly international cast of contributors, ranging from public intellectuals such as Peter Singer, Susan Blackmore, and A.C. Grayling, novelists, such as Joe Haldeman, and heavyweight philosophers of religion, including Graham Oppy and Michael Tooley Contributions range (...) from rigorous philosophical arguments to highly personal, even whimsical, accounts of how each of these notable thinkers have come to reject religion in their lives Likely to have broad appeal given the current public fascination with religious issues and the reception of such books as _The God Delusion_ and _The End of Faith_. (shrink)

50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists presents a collection of original essays drawn from an international group of prominent voices in the fields of academia, science, literature, media and politics who offer carefully considered statements of why they are atheists. Features a truly international cast of contributors, ranging from public intellectuals such as Peter Singer, Susan Blackmore, and A.C. Grayling, novelists, such as Joe Haldeman, and heavyweight philosophers of religion, including Graham Oppy and Michael Tooley Contributions range (...) from rigorous philosophical arguments to highly personal, even whimsical, accounts of how each of these notable thinkers have come to reject religion in their lives Likely to have broad appeal given the current public fascination with religious issues and the reception of such books as The God Delusion and The End of Faith. (shrink)

In his monograph on the praetorian prefect, L. L. Howe found it necessary to include an appendix concerning the Codex Justinianus as a source for this official. The problem was that while manuscripts or early editors had labelled various recipients of third-century imperial constitutions as prefects, all save two of those appellations were expunged by Krueger in his edition of the CJ. Howe considered it ‘impossible to believe’ that only two of the numerous pre-Diocletianic rescripts preserved by Justinian's compilers should (...) have been directed to praetorian prefects; but he also realised that without further evidence or argumentation, Krueger's scepticism could not simply be ignored. The solution was to label some cases dubious; others, following Krueger, were rejected altogether. But beyond this, Howe was able to discover several instances of entirely unlabelled addressees who could be identified with otherwise known praetorian prefects, and he supposed that many similar cases might be found. (shrink)

Review of two recent works on J.G.H. Feder: -/- Johann Georg Heinrich Feder. Ausgewählte Schriften. Hrgb. Von Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Udo Roth, Gideon Stiening. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. Werkprofile Band 9. -/- and -/- Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821): Empirismus und Popularphilosophie Zwischen Wolff und Kant. Hrgb. Von Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Udo Roth, Gideon Stiening. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. Werkprofile Band 10.

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the execution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling the agents to act (...) in a collaborative way such that their actions are rationally guided by a prior shared intention. This understanding of joint attention – as having a key functional role of enabling the rational guidance of joint intentional action by a prior shared intention – allows for an alternative understanding of the kind of minimal cooperation that infants can engage in. On this understanding, infants’ capacity to engage in joint actions is already an incipient capacity to engage in rational and intentional joint actions, albeit a capacity that is necessarily scaffolded by an adult rational co-partner. (shrink)

From the concrete experience of war, Michael S. Yandell constructs a phenomenology of “negative revelation” in which false or distorted claims of goodness and justice disintegrate and become meaningless, adding depth to the term moral injury.

Our aim in this paper is to present the distinct ways in which Wolff, Baumgarten, and Kant understand the relationship between necessitation, constraint, and reluctant action in an effort to illustrate the subtle ways in which their conceptions of obligation differ from each another. Whereas Wolff conceives of natural or moral obligation as incompatible with constraint, Baumgarten holds that constraint and reluctant action are, in some instances, compatible with natural obligation. Kant departs from Baumgarten by conceiving of obligation as necessarily (...) involving constraint: as Kant’s reply to Schiller’s famous objection reveals, obligation must take on the character of constraint to reluctant action on account of the fact that human beings possess inclinations that always threaten to impel them in directions that oppose morality. (shrink)

An Essay on Human Action seeks to provide a comprehensive, detailed, enlightening, and (in its detail) original account of human action. This account presupposes a theory of events as abstract, proposition-like entities, a theory which is given in the first chapter of the book. The core-issues of action-theory are then treated: what acting in general is (a version of the traditional volitional theory is proposed and defended); how actions are to be individuated; how long actions last; what acting intentionally is; (...) what doing one thing by doing another is; what basic action is; and what omitting to do something is. Attention is also given to the concepts of causation, intention, volition, deciding, choosing, and trying. Finally, a libertarian account of free action is tentatively proposed and defended. (shrink)

Using William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the play-within-the play, The Murder of Gonzago, as a case study, this essay argues that theatrical utterances constitute a special case of language usage not previously elucidated: the utterance of a statement with propositional content in theatre functions as an event. In short, the propositional content of a particular p (e.g. p1, p2, p3 …), whether or not it is true, is only understood—and understood to be true—if p1 is uttered in a particular time, place, (...) and situation (i.e. during a theatrical event); otherwise, the propositional content in those theatrical utterances can either be false or contingently true. (shrink)

Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics maps the ethical landscape of contemporary nursing. The book is the product of a collaboration between philosopher-ethicist Michael Yeo, nurse-ethicist Anne Moorhouse, and six representatives of various areas of professional nursing. It thus combines philosophical and ethical analysis with nursing knowledge and experience in a manner that is both understandable and relevant. The book is organized around six main concepts in nursing ethics: beneficence, autonomy, confidentiality, truth-telling, justice, and integrity. A chapter is devoted (...) to the elucidation of each of these concepts. In each chapter, historical background and conceptual analysis are supplemented by case studies that exemplify issues and show how the concept applies in nursing practice. In this new edition, the materials in each chapter have been updated to reflect recent developments in nursing and more generally in health care. In addition, a totally new chapter on ethical theory has been added. Complete with bibliographies and study questions for further analysis of cases, this book is ideally suited for textbook use. It will help both practitioners and students to deal better with the clinical problems and issues that are encountered in the field. However, it's simple prose and clear exposition of complex issues will make Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics attractive to anyone concerned about health care. (shrink)

Michael Dummett's three John Dewey Lectures--"The Concept of Truth," "Statements About the Past," and "The Metaphysics of Time"--were delivered at Columbia University in the spring of 2002. Revised and expanded, the lectures are presented here along with two new essays by Dummett, "Truth: Deniers and Defenders" and "The Indispensability of the Concept of Truth." In _Truth and the Past,_ Dummett clarifies his current positions on the metaphysical issue of realism and the philosophy of language. He is best known as (...) a proponent of antirealism, which loosely characterizes truth as what we are capable of knowing. The events of the past and statements about them are critical tests of an antirealist position. These essays continue and significantly contribute to Dummett's work. (shrink)

_A portion of the revenue from this book’s sales will be donated to Doctors Without Borders to assist the humanitarian work of nurses, doctors, and other health care providers in the fight against COVID-19 and beyond._ _Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics_ is an introduction to contemporary ethical issues in health care, designed especially for Canadian audiences. The book is organized around six key concepts: beneficence, autonomy, truth-telling, confidentiality, justice, and integrity. Each of these concepts is explained and discussed with (...) reference to professional and legal norms. The discussion is then supplemented by case studies that exemplify the relevant concepts and show how each applies in health care and nursing practice. This new fourth edition includes an added chapter on end-of-life issues, and it is revised throughout to reflect the latest developments on topics such as global health ethics, cultural competence, social media, and palliative sedation, as well as ethical issues relating to COVID-19. (shrink)

What is the relation between joint attention and common knowledge? On the one hand, the relation seems tight: the easiest and most reliable way of knowing something in common with another is for you and that other to be attentively aware of what you are together experiencing. On the other hand, they couldn’t seem further apart: joint attention is a mere perceptual phenomena that infants are capable of engaging in from nine months of age, whereas common knowledge is a cognitive (...) phenomenon involving (so it seems) complex, overlapping metarepresentational states that require the kind of sophisticated mindreading skills that developmental psychology has shown to be beyond the capabilities of young children. In 'The Shared World: Perceptual Common Knowledge, Demonstrative Communication, and Shared Social Space', Axel Seemann attempts, inter alia, to makensense of this conundrum. (shrink)

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates, Inquiry 1:161–171, 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, (...) we evaluate Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)